SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–297
_________________
TAMER MAHMOUD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
THOMAS W. TAYLOR, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 27, 2025]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Board of Education of Montgomery County, Mary
land (Board), has introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+
inclusive” storybooks into the elementary school curricu
lum. These books—and associated educational instructions
provided to teachers—are designed to “disrupt” children’s
thinking about sexuality and gender. The Board has told
parents that it will not give them notice when the books are
going to be used and that their children’s attendance during
those periods is mandatory. A group of parents from di
verse religious backgrounds sued to enjoin those policies.
They assert that the new curriculum, combined with the
Board’s decision to deny opt outs, impermissibly burdens
their religious exercise.
Today, we hold that the parents have shown that they are
entitled to a preliminary injunction. A government burdens
the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to
submit their children to instruction that poses “a very real
threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices
that the parents wish to instill. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 218 (1972). And a government cannot condition
the benefit of free public education on parents’ acceptance
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MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
of such instruction. Based on these principles, we conclude
that the parents are likely to succeed in their challenge to
the Board’s policies.
I
A
1
With just over one million residents, Montgomery County
is Maryland’s most populous county. According to a recent
survey, it is also the “most religiously diverse county” in the
Nation.1 In addition to hosting a diverse mix of Christian
denominations, the county ranks in the top five in the Na
tion in per-capita population of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and
Buddhists.2 The county’s religious diversity is accompanied
by strong cultural diversity as well. The county is home to
several notable ethnic communities. For example, the Ethi
opian community in Silver Spring is one of the largest in
the country.3 And according to one survey, “[o]nly 56.8% of
county residents speak English at home.” N. 1, supra.
Most Montgomery County residents with school age chil
dren, by choice or necessity, send them to public school. As
a general matter, Maryland law requires that resident chil
dren ages 5 to 18 “attend a public school regularly during
the entire school year.” Md. Educ. Code Ann. §7–301(a
1)(1) (2025). As an exception to this general rule, the State
permits parents to send their children to private school or
——————
1See A. Hertzler-McCain, Montgomery County, Maryland, Was Most
Religiously Diverse US County in 2023, Religion News Service (Aug. 30,
2024), https://religionnews.com/2024/08/30/montgomery-county-maryland
was-most-religiously-diverse-u-s-county-in-2023/.
2Public Religion Research Institute, 2023 PRRI Census of American
Religion: County-Level Data on Religious Identity and Diversity 19, 28,
42–49 (Aug. 29, 2024).
3See, e.g., R. Skirble, Silver Spring Is the Epicenter of a Thriving Ethi
opian Diaspora, Montgomery Magazine (Oct. 19, 2022), https://www.
montgomerymag.com/silver-spring-is-the-epicenter-of-a-thriving-ethiopian
diaspora/.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
3
to educate them at home if certain requirements can be
met. §7–301(a)(3). Parents who cause their children to be
absent unlawfully from school can face fines, mandatory
community service, and even imprisonment. §7–301(e).
Public education in Montgomery County is provided by
Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS), one of the
largest school districts in the Nation. In the 2022–2023
school year, MCPS enrolled 160,554 students in its 210
schools and had an operating budget of nearly $3 billion.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 597a–598a; MCPS, FY2024 Operating
Budget, p. vi–1 (2023). The district is overseen and man
aged by the Montgomery County Board of Education, a pol
icymaking body consisting of seven elected county residents
and one student. See Md. Educ. Code Ann. §3–901(b).
In recognition of the county’s religious diversity, the
Board’s “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diversity” pro
fess a commitment to making “reasonable accommodations”
for the religious “beliefs and practices” of MCPS students.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 210a, 212a.4 These accommodations
take various forms. For example, according to one MCPS
official, the Board “advises principals that schools should
avoid scheduling tests or other major events on dozens of
. . . ‘days of commemoration,’ during which MCPS expects
that many students may be absent . . . or engaged in reli
gious or cultural observances.” Id., at 602a.
This case, however, arises from the Board’s abject refusal
to heed widespread and impassioned pleas for accommoda
tion. In the years leading up to 2022, the Board apparently
“determined that the books used in its existing [English &
——————
4The Board has modified its religious diversity guidelines since the
2022–2023 school year, when many of the events in this lawsuit took
place. The most recent version of the Board’s guidelines, available
online, continues to state that “MCPS is committed to making reasonable
accommodations” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of its students.
MCPS, Religious Diversity Guidelines in Montgomery County Public
Schools 1 (2024–2025).
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MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
Language Arts] curriculum were not representative of
many students and families in Montgomery County be
cause they did not include LGBTQ characters.” Id., at 603a.
The Board therefore decided to introduce into the curricu
lum what it described as “‘LGBTQ+-inclusive texts.’”5 Id.,
at 174a. As one email sent by MCPS principals reflects, the
Board selected the books according to a “Critical Selection
Repertoire” that required selectors to review potential texts
and ask questions such as: “Is heteronormativity reinforced
or disrupted?”; “Is cisnormativity reinforced or disrupted?”;
and “Are power hierarchies that uphold the dominant cul
ture reinforced or disrupted?” Id., at 622a.
In accordance with this “[r]epertoire” and other criteria,
the Board eventually selected 13 “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts
for use in the English and Language Arts curriculum from
pre-K through 12th grade. Id., at 603a–604a, 622a. At is
sue in this lawsuit are the five “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story
books that are approved for students in Kindergarten
through fifth grade—in other words, for children who are
generally between 5 and 11 years old.6
A few short descriptions will serve to illustrate the gen
eral tenor of the storybooks. Intersection Allies tells the
stories of several children from different backgrounds, in
cluding Kate, who is apparently a transgender child. One
——————
5Some sources in the record use different variations of “LGBTQ+
inclusive” when referring to the books at issue in this case (e.g., “LGBTQ
Inclusive”). App. to Pet. for Cert. 603a. For consistency, we use
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” throughout the opinion, except in instances where
the designation appears in the middle of other quoted language, in which
case we retain the formulation that appears in the source.
6This lawsuit initially concerned seven books: one approved for pre-K
and Head Start students, and six approved for grades K through 5. How
ever, the one book approved for pre-K students was removed from the
curriculum due to content concerns, and one of the books approved for
grades K through 5 was removed for similar reasons. Brief for Petition
ers 11, n. 10; Brief for Respondents 6, n. 4.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
5
page shows Kate in a sex-neutral or sex-ambiguous bath
room, and Kate proclaims: “My friends defend my choices
and place. A bathroom, like all rooms, should be a safe
space.” Id., at 323a. Intersection Allies includes a “Page
By-Page Book Discussion Guide” that asserts: “When we
are born, our gender is often decided for us based on our sex
. . . . But at any point in our lives, we can choose to identify
with one gender, multiple genders, or neither gender.” Id.,
at 349a–350a. The discussion guide explains that “Kate
prefers the pronouns they/their/them” and asks “What pro
nouns fit you best?” Id., at 350a (boldface in original).
Prince & Knight tells the story of a coming-of-age prince
whose parents wish to match him with “a kind and worthy
bride.” Id., at 397a. After meeting with “many ladies,” the
prince tells his parents that he is “‘looking for something
different in a partner by [his] side.’” Id., at 398a, 400a.
Later in the book, the prince falls into the “embrace” of a
knight after the two finish battling a fearsome dragon. Id.,
at 415a. After the knight takes off his helmet, the prince
and knight “gaz[e] into each other’s eyes, [and] their hearts
beg[in] to race.” Id., at 418a–419a. The whole kingdom
later applauds “on the two men’s wedding day.” Id., at
424a.
Love Violet follows a young girl named Violet who has a
crush on her female classmate, Mira. Mira makes Violet’s
“heart skip” and “thunde[r] like a hundred galloping
horses.” Id., at 431a, 436a. Although Violet is initially too
afraid to interact with Mira, the two end up exchanging
gifts on Valentine’s Day. Afterwards, the two girls are seen
holding hands and “galloping over snowy drifts to see what
they might find. Together.” Id., at 446a.
Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope
tells the story of Penelope, a child who is initially treated as
a girl. The story is told from the perspective of Penelope,
who at one point says “If they’d all stop and listen, I’d tell
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MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
them about me. Inside I’m a boy.” Id., at 454a. When Pe
nelope’s mother later assures her that “‘If you feel like a
boy, that’s okay,’” Penelope responds: “‘No, Mama, I don’t
feel like a boy. I AM a boy.’” Id., at 458a. Penelope tells
her mother:
“‘I love you, Mama, but I don’t want to be you. I want
to be Papa. I don’t want tomorrow to come because to
morrow I’ll look like you. Please help me, Mama. Help
me to be a boy.’” Id., at 459a.
Penelope’s mother then agrees that she is a boy, and Pe
nelope says: “For the first time, my insides don’t feel like
fire. They feel like warm, golden love.” Id., at 462a. Later,
after the family starts treating Penelope as a boy, Penel
ope’s brother complains that “‘You can’t become a boy. You
have to be born one.’” Id., at 465a. This comment draws a
rebuke from Penelope’s mother: “‘Not everything needs to
make sense. This is about love.’” Ibid.
Finally, Uncle Bobby’s Wedding tells the story of a young
girl named Chloe who is informed that her favorite uncle,
Bobby, will be getting married to his boyfriend, Jamie.
When Bobby and Jamie announce their engagement, every
one is jubilant “except . . . Chloe.” Id., at 287a. Chloe says
that she does not “‘understand’” why her uncle is getting
married, but her mother responds by explaining: “ ‘When
grown-up people love each other that much, sometimes they
get married.’” Id., at 288a.
The Board suggested “that teachers incorporate the new
texts into the curriculum in the same way that other books
are used, namely, to put them on a shelf for students to find
on their own; to recommend a book to a student who would
enjoy it; to offer the books as an option for literature circles,
book clubs, or paired reading groups; or to use them as a
read aloud.” Id., at 604a–605a. And “[a]s with all curricu
lum resources,” the Board voiced its “expectation that
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
7
teachers use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books as part of instruc
tion.” Id., at 605a. An MCPS official has made clear that
“[t]eachers cannot . . . elect not to use the LGBTQ-Inclusive
Books at all.” Ibid.
The Board also contemplated that instruction involving
the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would include class
room discussion. See id., at 642a (Board’s lawyer: “there
will be discussion that ensues. In fact, I think everyone
would hope that discussion ensues”). In anticipation of
such discussion, the Board hosted a “professional develop
ment workshop” in the summer of 2022, where it provided
teachers with a guidance document suggesting how they
might respond to student inquiries regarding the themes
presented in the books. Id., at 273a–276a, 604a, 628a–
635a. For example, if a student asserts that two men can
not get married, the guidance document encouraged teach
ers to respond by saying: “When people are adults they can
get married. Two men who love each other can decide they
want to get married.” Id., at 628a. If a student claims that
a character “can’t be a boy if he was born a girl,” teachers
were encouraged to respond: “That comment is hurtful.”
Id., at 630a. And if a student asks “[w]hat’s transgender?”,
it was recommended that teachers explain: “When we’re
born, people make a guess about our gender and label us
‘boy’ or ‘girl’ based on our body parts. Sometimes they’re
right and sometimes they’re wrong.” Ibid. The guidance
document encouraged teachers to “[d]isrupt the either/or
thinking” of their students. Id., at 629a, 633a.
At the same workshop, the Board also provided teachers
with a guidance document that suggested particular re
sponses to inquiries by parents. For example, if a parent
were to ask whether the school was attempting to teach a
child to “reject” the values taught at home, teachers were
encouraged to respond that “[t]eaching about LGBTQ+ is
not about making students think a certain way; it is to show
that there is no one ‘right’ or ‘normal’ way to be.” Id., at
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MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
638a. The guidance also urged teachers to assure parents
that there would not be “explicit instruction” about gender
and sexual identity, but that “there may be a need to define
words that are new and unfamiliar to students,” and that
“questions and conversations might organically happen.”
Id., at 640a. If parents were not comforted by that infor
mation, teachers could tell them that “[p]arents always
have the choice to keep their student(s) home while using
these texts; however, it will not be an excused absence.”
Ibid.
2
The Board officially launched the “LGBTQ+-inclusive”
texts into MCPS schools in the 2022–2023 school year.
Shortly thereafter, parents “began contacting individual
teachers, principals, or MCPS staff ” about the storybooks
and asking that their children be excused from classroom
instruction related to them. Id., at 606a. Some parents
showed up at the Board’s public business meetings to ex
press their concerns about the storybooks’ content. In an
early 2023 meeting, for example, one parent represented
herself as “a voice for parents in [her] community, many of
[whom] are actually working today and unable to attend.”
See MCPS, Jan. 12, 2023, Business Meeting, at 27:15
27:20, https://mcpsmd.new.swagit.com/videos/196679. She
said that MCPS parents were “frustrated” because, in their
view, “educators and administrators are going behind what
[parents] are teaching their kids at home, and pushing
ideas of gender ideology on their kids.” Id., at 27:21–27:30.
The parent felt that the Board was “implying to [children]
that their religion, their belief system, and their family tra
dition is actually wrong.” Id., at 28:25–28:30.
At the same Board meeting, one Board member re
sponded by saying that “some of the testimony today was
disturbing to me personally. Transgender, LGBTQ individ
uals are not an ideology, they are a reality. . . . [T]here are
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
9
religions out there that teach that women should only
achieve certain subservient roles in life, and MCPS would
never think of not having a book in a classroom that showed
a woman” in a professional role. Id., at 38:35–39:00. The
Board’s student member agreed with the sentiment and
proclaimed that “ignorance and hate does exist within our
community, but please know that every student—each of
our 160,000 students in our large county—has a place in
the school system.” Id., at 40:25–40:36.
Initially, the Board compromised with objecting parents
by notifying them when the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” story
books would be taught and permitting their children to be
excused from instruction involving the books. That policy
was consistent with the Board’s general “Guidelines for Re
specting Religious Diversity,” which at the time provided
that “[w]hen possible, schools should try to make reasona
ble and feasible adjustments to the instructional program
to accommodate requests from students, or requests from
parents/guardians on behalf of their students, to be excused
from specific classroom discussions or activities that they
believe would impose a substantial burden on their reli
gious beliefs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 220a–221a.
This compromise, however, did not last long. In March
2023, less than a year after the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” texts
were introduced, the Board issued a statement declaring
that “[s]tudents and families may not choose to opt out of
engaging” with the storybooks and that “teachers will not
send home letters to inform families when inclusive books
are read in the future.” Id., at 657a. According to one
MCPS official, the Board decided to change its policy be
cause, among other things, “individual principals and
teachers could not accommodate the growing number of opt
out requests without causing significant disruptions to the
classroom environment.” Id., at 607a. The official also
stated that permitting some students to exit the classroom
while the storybooks were being taught would expose other
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MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
students “to social stigma and isolation.” Id., at 608a. It
was therefore announced that any existing accommoda
tions would expire at the end of the 2022–2023 school year.
Shortly after the Board rescinded parental opt outs, more
than 1,000 parents signed a petition asking the Board to
restore opt out rights. See Brief for Petitioners 14. And
hundreds of displeased parents, including many Muslim
and Ethiopian Orthodox parents, appeared at the Board’s
public meetings and implored the Board to allow opt outs.
Id., at 14–15. At a May 2023 meeting, one community mem
ber testified that “thousands” of parents felt “deeply dis
mayed and betrayed” by the rescission of opt outs from “con
tent that conflict[s] with their sincerely held religious
beliefs.” MCPS, May 25, 2023, Business Meeting, at 35:33
35:44, https://mcpsmd.new.swagit.com/videos/232766. At
the same meeting, an MCPS student testified and asked the
Board “to allow students like me to opt out of content and
books that contain sensitive and mature topics that go
against my religious beliefs.” Id., at 40:47–40:56.
The Board was unmoved. After the testimony, several
Board members and another MCPS official spoke up to
“clarify” that the storybooks would not be used for explicit
instruction on sexuality and gender, but rather as part of
the “literacy curriculum.” Id., at 1:11:14–1:16:22. Accord
ing to a later news article, one Board member recalled that
“she felt ‘kind of sorry’” for the student who testified in fa
vor of opt outs, “and wondered to what extent she may have
been ‘parroting dogma’ learned from her parents.”7 The
Board member also expressed her view that “‘[i]f [parents]
——————
7E. Espey, Parents, Students, Doctors React to MCPS Lawsuit Target
ing LGBTQ+ Storybooks, Bethesda Magazine (June 2, 2023), https://
bethesdamagazine.com/2023/06/02/parents-students-doctors-react-to-mcps
lawsuit-targeting-lgbtq-storybooks; see also Mahmoud v. McKnight, 688
F. Supp. 3d 265, 285 (Md. 2023) (recounting the Board member’s state
ments).
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
11
want their child to receive an education that strictly ad
heres to their religious dogma, they can send their kid to a
private religious school.’” N. 7, supra. The Board member
went on to suggest that the objecting parents were compa
rable to “‘white supremacists’” who want to prevent their
children from learning about civil rights and “‘xenophobes’”
who object to “‘stories about immigrant families.’” Ibid.
The Board continues to permit children to opt out of other
school activities, including the “family life and human sex
uality” unit of instruction, for which opt outs are required
under Maryland law. Code of Md. Regs., tit. 13a,
§04.18.01(D)(2)(e)(i) (2025); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 657a.
And although the Board has amended its “Guidelines for
Respecting Religious Diversity” to narrow the circum
stances in which opt outs are permissible, those guidelines
still allow opt outs from “noncurricular activities, such as
classroom parties or free-time events that involve materials
or practices in conflict with a family’s religious, and/or
other, practices.” Id., at 672a.
B
1
At the time when this lawsuit was filed, petitioners
Tamer Mahmoud and Enas Barakat had three children en
rolled in MCPS, including one who was still in elementary
school. Mahmoud and Barakat are Muslims who believe
“that mankind has been divinely created as male and fe
male” and “that ‘gender’ cannot be unwoven from biological
‘sex’—to the extent the two are even distinct—without re
jecting the dignity and direction God bestowed on humanity
from the start.” Id., at 165a–166a. Mahmoud and Barakat
believe that it would be “immoral” to expose their “young,
impressionable, elementary-aged son” to a curriculum that
“undermine[s] Islamic teaching.” Id., at 532a. And, in their
view, “[t]he storybooks at issue in this lawsuit . . . directly
undermine [their] efforts to raise” their son in the Islamic
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faith “because they encourage young children to question
their sexuality and gender . . . and to dismiss parental and
religious guidance on these issues.” Ibid.
After the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks were intro
duced, Mahmoud and Barakat asked to have their son ex
cused from the classroom when Prince & Knight was read.
Their son’s principal initially permitted the boy to sit out
side the classroom during that time. But, soon after, the
Board announced that opt outs would no longer be availa
ble. Mahmoud and Barakat then felt “religiously compelled
to send their son to private school at significant financial
sacrifice.” Brief for Petitioners 16.
Petitioners Jeff and Svitlana Roman also had a son en
rolled in an MCPS elementary school when this lawsuit was
filed.
Jeff Roman is Catholic, and Svitlana Roman is
Ukrainian Orthodox. They believe that “sexuality is ex
pressed only in marriage between a man and a woman for
creating life and strengthening the marital union.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 166a. The Romans further believe “that gen
der and biological sex are intertwined and inseparable” and
that “the young need to be helped to accept their own body
as it was created.” Id., at 537a (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Romans understand that their son “loves his
teachers and implicitly trusts them,” and so they fear that
allowing those teachers to “teach principles about sexuality
or gender identity that conflict with [their] religious beliefs”
would “significantly interfer[e] with [their] ability to form
[their son’s] religious faith and religious outlook on life.”
Id., at 541a.
After the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks were intro
duced, the Romans asked the principal of their son’s ele
mentary school to notify them when the books were being
read and to excuse their son from that instruction. The Ro
mans were initially told that it was their “right” to ask that
their son not be present when the books are read, id., at
496a, but they were later informed that notice and opt outs
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
13
would no longer be provided. Thus, the Romans, like
Mahmoud and Barakat, were “religiously compelled to send
their son to private school, at significant expense.” Brief for
Petitioners 18.
Petitioners Chris and Melissa Persak have two elementary
age daughters who attend public school in Montgomery
County. The Persaks are Catholics who believe “that all
humans are created as male or female, and that a person’s
biological sex is a gift bestowed by God that is both un
changing and integral to that person’s being.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 543a. The Persaks believe “that children—partic
ularly those in elementary school—are highly impressiona
ble to ideological instruction presented in children’s books
or by schoolteachers.” Id., at 544a. They are concerned that
the Board’s “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks “are being used
to impose an ideological view of family life and sexuality
that characterizes any divergent beliefs as ‘hurtful.’” Ibid.
They think that such instruction will “undermine [their] ef
forts to raise [their] children in accordance with” their reli
gious faith. Ibid. The Persaks’ daughters were initially
permitted to opt out of instruction related to the storybooks,
but they no longer have that option.
The final petitioner, Kids First, is an unincorporated as
sociation of parents and teachers that was “formed to advo
cate for the return of parental notice and opt-out rights in
the Montgomery County Public Schools.” Id., at 624a. One
of Kids First’s board members—Grace Morrison—has a
daughter who previously attended an MCPS elementary
school. Morrison’s daughter has Down syndrome and at
tention deficit disorder. She previously required special ac
commodations from her public school, including a “full time,
one-on-one paraeducator.” Id., at 624a–625a. Morrison’s
daughter also received special services from the school,
such as speech and occupational therapy. Morrison and her
husband are Catholics who believe that “marriage is the
lifelong union of one man and one woman” and that gender
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Opinion of the Court
is “interwoven” with sex. Id., at 625a. Due to their daugh
ter’s learning challenges, they fear that she “doesn’t under
stand or differentiate instructions from her teachers and
parents” and that they “won’t be able to contradict what she
hears from teachers.” Id., at 626a.
Because of the services provided to her disabled daughter
in public school, Morrison faced enormous “pressure” to
keep her daughter enrolled. Ibid. She asked that her
daughter be excused from “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction,
even after the Board’s decision to rescind opt outs. She was
told, however, that opt outs would not be possible. As a re
sult, the Morrisons felt “religiously compelled” to remove
their daughter from public school. Brief for Petitioners 19.
They anticipate that it will cost at least $25,000 per year to
replace the academic and other services that their daughter
formerly received from the public school system.
2
Faced with the Board’s decision to rescind opt outs, peti
tioners filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. Among other things, they as
serted that the Board’s no-opt-out policy infringed their
right to the free exercise of their religion. See Kennedy v.
Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 524 (2022). They
sought a preliminary and permanent injunction “prohibit
ing the School Board from forcing [their] children and other
students—over the objection of their parents—to read, lis
ten to, or discuss” the storybooks. App. to Pet. for Cert.
206a.
In support of their request, the parents relied heavily on
this Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205.
That case concerned Amish parents who wished to with
draw their children from conventional schooling after the
eighth grade, in direct contravention of a Wisconsin law re
quiring children to attend school until the age of 16. In
Yoder, we recognized that parents have a right “to direct
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
15
the religious upbringing of their children,” and that this
right can be infringed by laws that pose “a very real threat
of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices that par
ents wish to instill in their children. Id., at 218, 233. Given
the substantial burdens that Wisconsin’s compulsory-at
tendance law placed on the religious practices of the Amish,
we held that it “carrie[d] with it precisely the kind of objec
tive danger to the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id., at 218.
In the present case, the parents asserted that Yoder’s
principle applies to their situation, and they therefore
asked for a preliminary injunction permitting their children
to opt out of the challenged instruction pending the comple
tion of their lawsuit. The District Court denied that relief.
It characterized the petitioners’ primary argument as an
objection to school “indoctrination” and asserted that the
petitioners had not “identified any case recognizing a free
exercise violation based on indoctrination.” Mahmoud v.
McKnight, 688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 295 (Md. 2023). It dis
missed Yoder as “sui generis” and “inexorably linked to the
Amish community’s unique religious beliefs and practices.”
688 F. Supp. 3d, at 294, 301. And although the District
Court acknowledged that the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” curricu
lum might result in petitioners’ being “less likely to suc
ceed” in raising their children in their religious faiths, id.,
at 300, it nonetheless held that the curriculum was likely
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The ma
jority did not expressly endorse the District Court’s view re
garding the constitutionality of “indoctrination,” but it sug
gested that petitioners could succeed on their free exercise
claim only if they could “show direct or indirect coercion
arising out of the exposure” to the storybooks. Mahmoud v.
McKnight, 102 F. 4th 191, 212 (2024). And the majority
found that the evidence in the record was insufficient to
make that showing. The majority expressed concern that
16
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
“[t]he record does not show how the Storybooks are actually
being used in classrooms.” Id., at 213. And without such
evidence, the majority held, petitioners could not obtain a
preliminary injunction because it could not simply be as
sumed that any past lessons had or that any future lessons
would “cross the line and pressure students to change their
views or act contrary to their faith.” Ibid. As for petition
ers’ reliance on Yoder, the majority quickly dismissed that
argument, describing the decision as “markedly circum
scribed” and “tailored to the specific evidence in [its] rec
ord.” 102 F. 4th, at 210–211.
Judge Quattlebaum dissented. He accepted the parents’
representation that “their faith compels that they teach
their children about sex, human sexuality, gender and fam
ily life.” Id., at 222. And he acknowledged their claim that
“the messages from the books conflict with and undermine
the sincerely held religious beliefs they hold and seek to
convey to their children.” Ibid. Judge Quattlebaum there
fore concluded that the Board had “force[d] the parents to
make a choice—either adhere to their faith or receive a free
public education for their children.” Ibid. Forcing parents
to make such a choice was, in his view, a burden on their
religion exercise.
After the Fourth Circuit ruled, the parents asked this
Court to review the decision, and we granted their petition
for a writ of certiorari. 604 U. S. ___ (2025). We now hold
that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a pre
liminary injunction and reverse the judgment below.
II
Our Constitution proclaims that “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Amdt. 1.
That restriction applies equally to the States by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U. S. 296, 303 (1940). And the right to free exercise, like
other First Amendment rights, is not “shed . . . at the
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Opinion of the Court
17
schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com
munity School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506–507 (1969). Gov
ernment schools, like all government institutions, may not
place unconstitutional burdens on religious exercise.
The parents assert that the Board’s introduction of the
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—combined with its deci
sion to withhold notice and opt outs—unconstitutionally
burdens their religious exercise. At this stage, the parents
seek a preliminary injunction that would permit them to
have their children excused from instruction related to the
storybooks while this lawsuit proceeds. To obtain that form
of preliminary relief, the parents must show that they are
likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an in
junction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008). The
parents have made that showing.
III
To begin, we hold that the parents are likely to succeed
on their claim that the Board’s policies unconstitutionally
burden their religious exercise. “[W]e have long recognized
the rights of parents to direct ‘the religious upbringing’ of
their children.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591
U. S. 464, 486 (2020) (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214).
And we have held that those rights are violated by govern
ment policies that “substantially interfer[e] with the reli
gious development” of children. Id., at 218. Such interfer
ence, we have observed, “carries with it precisely the kind
of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the
First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Ibid. For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that such an “objec
tive danger” is present here.
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Opinion of the Court
A
We start by describing the nature of the religious practice
at issue here and explaining why it is burdened by the
Board’s policies.
1
At its heart, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend
ment protects “the ability of those who hold religious beliefs
of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through the
performance of ” religious acts. Kennedy, 597 U. S., at 524
(internal quotation marks omitted). And for many people
of faith across the country, there are few religious acts more
important than the religious education of their children.
See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591
U. S. 732, 754 (2020) (“Religious education is vital to many
faiths practiced in the United States”). Indeed, for many
Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others, the religious educa
tion of children is not merely a preferred practice but rather
a religious obligation. See id., at 754–756. The parent pe
titioners in this case reflect this reality: they all believe they
have a “sacred obligation” or “God-given responsibility” to
raise their children in a way that is consistent with their
religious beliefs and practices. App. to Pet. for Cert. 531a,
538a, 543a, 625a.
The practice of educating one’s children in one’s religious
beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a gen
erous measure of protection from our Constitution. “Draw
ing on ‘enduring American tradition,’ we have long recog
nized the rights of parents to direct ‘the religious
upbringing’ of their children.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486
(quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214, 232). And this is not
merely a right to teach religion in the confines of one’s own
home. Rather, it extends to the choices that parents wish
to make for their children outside the home. It protects, for
example, a parent’s decision to send his or her child to a
private religious school instead of a public school. Pierce v.
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Opinion of the Court
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 532–535 (1925).
19
Due to financial and other constraints, however, many
parents “have no choice but to send their children to a pub
lic school.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 424 (2007)
(ALITO, J., concurring). As a result, the right of parents “to
direct the religious upbringing of their” children would be
an empty promise if it did not follow those children into the
public school classroom. We have thus recognized limits on
the government’s ability to interfere with a student’s reli
gious upbringing in a public school setting.
An early example comes from our decision in West Vir
ginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). In that
case, we considered a resolution adopted by the West Vir
ginia State Board of Education that required students “to
participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented
by the flag.” Id., at 626 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If students failed to comply, they faced expulsion and could
not be readmitted until they yielded to the State’s com
mand. Id., at 629. A group of plaintiffs sued to prevent the
enforcement of this policy against Jehovah’s Witnesses who
considered the flag to be a “graven image” and refused to
salute it. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
challengers asserted that the policy was, among other
things, “an unconstitutional denial of religious freedom.”
Id., at 630.
We agreed that the policy could not be squared with the
First Amendment. The effect of the State’s policy, we ob
served, was to “condition access to public education on mak
ing a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time
to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child.”
Id., at 630–631. Although the policy did not clearly require
students to “forego any contrary convictions of their own
and become unwilling converts,” it nonetheless required a
particular “affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.”
Id., at 633. For a public school to require students to make
such an affirmation, in contravention of their beliefs and
20
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
those of their parents, was to go further than the First
Amendment would allow.
Barnette dealt with an especially egregious kind of direct
coercion: a requirement that students make an affirmation
contrary to their parents’ religious beliefs. But that does
not mean that the protections of the First Amendment ex
tend only to policies that compel children to depart from the
religious practices of their parents. To the contrary, in
Yoder, we held that the Free Exercise Clause protects
against policies that impose more subtle forms of interfer
ence with the religious upbringing of children.
Yoder concerned a Wisconsin law that required parents
to send their children to public or private school until the
age of 16. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and
Adin Yutzy were members of Wisconsin’s Amish commu
nity who refused to send their children to public school after
the completion of the eighth grade. In their view, the values
taught in high school were “in marked variance with Amish
values and the Amish way of life,” and would result in an
“impermissible exposure of their children to a ‘worldly’ in
fluence in conflict with their beliefs.” 406 U. S., at 211. In
response, this Court observed that formal high school edu
cation would “plac[e] Amish children in an environment
hostile to Amish beliefs . . . with pressure to conform to the
styles, manners, and ways of the peer group” and that it
would “tak[e] them away from their community, physically
and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adoles
cent period of life.” Ibid. “In short,” the Court concluded,
“high school attendance . . . interposes a serious barrier to
the integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious
community.” Id., at 211–212.
In Yoder, unlike in Barnette, there was no suggestion that
the compulsory-attendance law would compel Amish chil
dren to make an affirmation that was contrary to their par
ents’ or their own religious beliefs. Nor was there a sugges
tion that Amish children would be compelled to commit
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Opinion of the Court
21
some specific practice forbidden by their religion. Rather,
the threat to religious exercise was premised on the fact
that high school education would “expos[e] Amish children
to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values
contrary to [their] beliefs” and would “substantially inter
fer[e] with the religious development of the Amish child.”
406 U. S., at 218.
That interference, the Court held, violated the parents’
free exercise rights. The compulsory-education law “car
rie[d] with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the
free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was de
signed to prevent” because it placed Amish children into “an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs,” where they would
face “pressure to conform” to contrary viewpoints and life
styles. Id., at 211, 218.
As our decision in Yoder reflects, the question whether a
law “substantially interfer[es] with the religious develop
ment” of a child will always be fact-intensive. Id., at 218.
It will depend on the specific religious beliefs and practices
asserted, as well as the specific nature of the educational
requirement or curricular feature at issue. Educational re
quirements targeted toward very young children, for exam
ple, may be analyzed differently from educational require
ments for high school students. A court must also consider
the specific context in which the instruction or materials at
issue are presented. Are they presented in a neutral man
ner, or are they presented in a manner that is “hostile” to
religious viewpoints and designed to impose upon students
a “pressure to conform”? Id., at 211.
We now turn to the application of these principles to this
case.
2
In light of the record before us, we hold that the Board’s
introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—com
bined with its decision to withhold notice to parents and to
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Opinion of the Court
forbid opt outs—substantially interferes with the religious
development of their children and imposes the kind of bur
den on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable.
To understand why, start with the storybooks them
selves. Like many books targeted at young children, the
books are unmistakably normative. They are clearly de
signed to present certain values and beliefs as things to be
celebrated and certain contrary values and beliefs as things
to be rejected.
Take, for example, the message sent by the books con
cerning same-sex marriage. Many Americans “advocate
with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts,
same-sex marriage should not be condoned.” Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 679 (2015). That group includes
each of the parents in this case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 530a,
537a, 543a, 625a. The storybooks, however, are designed to
present the opposite viewpoint to young, impressionable
children who are likely to accept without question any
moral messages conveyed by their teachers’ instruction.
For example, the book Prince & Knight clearly conveys
the message that same-sex marriage should be accepted by
all as a cause for celebration. The young reader is guided
to feel distressed at the prince’s failure to find a princess,
and then to celebrate when the prince meets his male part
ner. See id., at 397a–401a, 419a–423a. The book relates
that “on the two men’s wedding day, the air filled with cheer
and laughter, for the prince and his shining knight would
live happily ever after.” Id., at 424a. Those celebrating the
same-sex wedding are not just family members and close
friends, but the entire kingdom. For young children, to
whom this and the other storybooks are targeted, such cel
ebration is liable to be processed as having moral connota
tions. If this same-sex marriage makes everyone happy and
leads to joyous celebration by all, doesn’t that mean it is in
every respect a good thing? High school students may un
derstand that widespread approval of a practice does not
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Opinion of the Court
23
necessarily mean that everyone should accept it, but very
young children are most unlikely to appreciate that fine
point.
Uncle Bobby’s Wedding, the only book that the dissent is
willing to discuss in any detail, conveys the same message
more subtly. The atmosphere is jubilant after Uncle Bobby
and his boyfriend announce their engagement. Id., at 286a
(“Everyone was smiling and talking and crying and laugh
ing” (emphasis added)). The book’s main character, Chloe,
does not share this excitement. “‘I don’t understand!’” she
exclaims, “‘Why is Uncle Bobby getting married?’” Id., at
288a. The book is coy about the precise reason for Chloe’s
question, but the question is used to tee up a direct message
to young readers: “‘Bobby and Jamie love each other,’ said
Mummy. ‘When grown-up people love each other that
much, sometimes they get married.’” Ibid. The book there
fore presents a specific, if subtle, message about marriage.
It asserts that two people can get married, regardless of
whether they are of the same or the opposite sex, so long as
they “‘love each other.’” Ibid. That view is now accepted
by a great many Americans, but it is directly contrary to the
religious principles that the parents in this case wish to in
still in their children.
It is significant that this book does not simply refer to
same-sex marriage as an existing practice. Instead, it pre
sents acceptance of same-sex marriage as a perspective that
should be celebrated. The book’s narrative arc reaches its
peak with the actual event of Uncle Bobby’s wedding, which
is presented as a joyous event that is met with universal
approval. See id., at 300a–305a. And again, there are
many Americans who would view the event that way, and
it goes without saying that they have every right to do so.
But other Americans wish to present a different moral mes
sage to their children. And their ability to present that
message is undermined when the exact opposite message is
positively reinforced in the public school classroom at a very
24
young age.
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
Next, consider the messages sent by the storybooks on
the subject of sex and gender. Many Americans, like the
parents in this case, believe that biological sex reflects di
vine creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and that
children should be encouraged to accept their sex and to live
accordingly. Id., at 530a–531a, 538a–540a, 543a, 625a.
But the challenged storybooks encourage children to adopt
a contrary viewpoint.
Intersection Allies presents a
transgender child in a sex-ambiguous bathroom and pro
claims that “[a] bathroom, like all rooms, should be a safe
space.” Id., at 323a. The book also includes a discussion
guide that asserts that “at any point in our lives, we can
choose to identify with one gender, multiple genders, or nei
ther gender” and asks children “What pronouns fit you
best?” Id., at 350a (boldface in original). The book and the
accompanying discussion guidance present as a settled
matter a hotly contested view of sex and gender that
sharply conflicts with the religious beliefs that the parents
wish to instill in their children.
The book Born Ready presents similar ideas in an even
less veiled manner. The book follows the story of Penelope,
an apparently biological female who asserts “‘I AM a boy.’”
Id., at 458a. Not only does the story convey the message
that Penelope is a boy simply because that is what she
chooses to be, but it slyly conveys a positive message about
transgender medical procedures. Penelope says the follow
ing to her mother:
“‘I love you, Mama, but I don’t want to be you. I want
to be Papa. I don’t want tomorrow to come because to
morrow I’ll look like you. Please help me, Mama. Help
me to be a boy.’” Id., at 459a.
Penelope’s mother then agrees that Penelope is a boy, and
Penelope exclaims: “For the first time, my insides don’t feel
like fire. They feel like warm, golden love.” Id., at 462a. To
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Opinion of the Court
25
young children, the moral implication of the story is that it
is seriously harmful to deny a gender transition and that
transitioning is a highly positive experience. The book goes
so far as to present a contrary view as something to be rep
rimanded. When the main character’s brother says “‘You
can’t become a boy. You have to be born one,’” his mother
corrects him by saying: “‘Not everything needs to make
sense. This is about love.’” Id., at 465a (emphasis in origi
nal). The upshot is that it is hurtful, perhaps even hateful,
to hold the view that gender is inextricably bound with bio
logical sex.
These books carry with them “a very real threat of under
mining” the religious beliefs that the parents wish to instill
in their children. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. Like the com
pulsory high school education considered in Yoder, these
books impose upon children a set of values and beliefs that
are “hostile” to their parents’ religious beliefs. Id., at 211.
And the books exert upon children a psychological “pressure
to conform” to their specific viewpoints. Ibid. The books
therefore present the same kind of “objective danger to the
free exercise of religion” that we identified in Yoder. Id., at
218.
That “objective danger” is only exacerbated by the fact
that the books will be presented to young children by au
thority figures in elementary school classrooms. As repre
sentatives of the Board have admitted, “there is an expec
tation that teachers use the LGBTQ-Inclusive Books as
part of instruction,” and “there will be discussion that en
sues.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 605a, 642a.
The Board has left little mystery as to what that discus
sion might look like. The Board provided teachers with sug
gested responses to student questions related to the books,
and the responses make it clear that instruction related to
the storybooks will “substantially interfer[e]” with the par
ents’ ability to direct the “religious development” of their
children. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. In response to a child
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Opinion of the Court
who states that two men “can’t get married,” teachers are
encouraged to respond “[t]wo men who love each other can
decide they want to get married . . . . There are so many
different kinds of families and ways to be a family.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 628a–629a. If a child says “[h]e can’t be a boy
if he was born a girl,” the teacher is urged to respond “that
comment is hurtful.” Id., at 630a. If a child asks “What’s
transgender?”, it is suggested that the teacher answer:
“When we’re born, people make a guess about our gender
. . . .
Sometimes they’re right and sometimes they’re
wrong.” Ibid.
In other contexts, we have recognized the potentially co
ercive nature of classroom instruction of this kind. “The
State exerts great authority and coercive power through”
public schools “because of the students’ emulation of teach
ers as role models and the children’s susceptibility to peer
pressure.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 584 (1987);
see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 592 (1992) (“[T]here
are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of con
science from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools”). Young children, like those of pe
titioners, are often “impressionable” and “implicitly trus[t]”
their teachers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 532a, 541a.8 Here,
the Board requires teachers to instruct young children us
ing storybooks that explicitly contradict their parents’ reli
gious views, and it encourages the teachers to correct the
children and accuse them of being “hurtful” when they ex
press a degree of religious confusion. Id., at 630a. Such
——————
8The dissent tries to divert attention from the ages of the children sub
ject to the instruction at issue here. It sees no difference between peti
tioners’ young children and the high school students in Kennedy v.
Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507 (2022). See post, at 11 (opinion of
SOTOMAYOR, J.). And it criticizes our decision for taking the age of stu
dents into account. Post, at 19. It goes without saying, however, that
the age of the children involved is highly relevant in any assessment of
the likely effect of instruction on the subjects in question.
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Opinion of the Court
27
instruction “carries with it precisely the kind of objective
danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amend
ment was designed to prevent.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218.
3
None of the counterarguments raised by the dissent, the
Board, the courts below, or the Board’s amici give us any
reason to doubt the existence of a burden here.
a
To start, we cannot accept the Board’s characterization of
the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” instruction as mere “exposure to
objectionable ideas” or as lessons in “mutual respect.” Brief
for Respondents 27–28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 101, 169. As we
have explained, the storybooks unmistakably convey a par
ticular viewpoint about same-sex marriage and gender.
And the Board has specifically encouraged teachers to rein
force this viewpoint and to reprimand any children who dis
agree. That goes far beyond mere “exposure.”
We similarly disagree with the dissent’s deliberately
blinkered view that these storybooks and related instruc
tion merely “expos[e] students to the ‘message’ that LGBTQ
people exist” and teach them to treat others with kindness.
See post, at 1, 31 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In making
this argument, the dissent ignores what anyone who reads
these books can readily see. It ignores the messages that
the authors plainly intended to convey. And, what is per
haps most telling, it ignores the Board’s stated reasons for
inserting these books into the curriculum and much of the
instructions it gave to teachers. See supra, at 3–4, 6–8.
Only by air-brushing the record can the dissent claim that
the books and instruction are just about exposure and kind
ness.
In any event, the Board and the dissent are mistaken
when they rely extensively on the concept of “exposure.”
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Opinion of the Court
The question in cases of this kind is whether the educa
tional requirement or curriculum at issue would “substan
tially interfer[e] with the religious development” of the
child or pose “a very real threat of undermining” the reli
gious beliefs and practices the parent wishes to instill in the
child. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. Whether or not a require
ment or curriculum could be characterized as “exposure” is
not the touchstone for determining whether that line is
crossed.
b
We are also unpersuaded by the Board’s reliance—echoed
by the dissent—on our decisions in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S.
693 (1986), and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec
tive Assn., 485 U. S. 439 (1988). See post, at 16–19 (opinion
of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In Bowen, a father mounted a free ex
ercise challenge to the Government’s use of a Social Secu
rity number associated with his daughter. 476 U. S., at
695–698. And in Lyng, Native Americans and other plain
tiffs raised a free exercise challenge to the construction of a
paved road on federal land. 485 U. S., at 442–443. In those
cases, we held that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply can
not be understood to require the Government to conduct its
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 699, even
when the conduct of such internal affairs might result in
“incidental interference with an individual’s spiritual activ
ities,” Lyng, 485 U. S., at 450. And, we emphasized, that
conclusion was appropriate because the government actions
at issue did not “discriminate” against religion or “coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.”
Id., at 450, 453; see also Bowen, 476 U. S., at 703 (plurality
opinion).
These cases have no application here. The government’s
operation of the public schools is not a matter of “internal
affairs” akin to the administration of Social Security or the
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Opinion of the Court
29
selection of “filing cabinets.” Id., at 700 (majority opinion).
It implicates direct, coercive interactions between the State
and its young residents. The public school imposes rules
and standards of conduct on its students and holds a limited
power to discipline them for misconduct. See, e.g., Mahanoy
Area School Dist. v. B. L., 594 U. S. 180, 187–188 (2021). If
questions of public school curriculum were purely a matter
of internal affairs, one could imagine that other First
Amendment protections—such as the right to free speech
or the right to be free from established religion—would also
be inapplicable in the public school context. But our prece
dents plainly provide otherwise. See Tinker, 393 U. S., at
506; Weisman, 505 U. S., at 587.
c
Next, we cannot agree with the decision of the lower
courts to dismiss our holding in Yoder out of hand. Alt
hough the decision turned on a close analysis of the facts in
the record, there is no reason to conclude that the decision
is “sui generis” or uniquely “tailored to [its] specific evi
dence,” as the courts below reasoned. See 688 F. Supp. 3d,
at 301; 102 F. 4th, at 211. We have never confined Yoder to
its facts. To the contrary, we have treated it like any other
precedent. We have at times relied on it as a statement of
general principles. See, e.g., Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 486;
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 881, and n. 1 (1990). And we have
distinguished it when appropriate. See, e.g., Lyng, 485
U. S., at 456–457.
True, we noted in Yoder that the Amish had made a “con
vincing showing, one that probably few other religious
groups or sects could make.” 406 U. S., at 235–236; see post,
at 21 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). But that language must
be read in the context of the specific claims raised by the
Amish respondents. They did not challenge a discrete edu
cational requirement or element of the curriculum, like the
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plaintiffs in Barnette. Instead, they asserted a right to
withdraw their children from all conventional schooling af
ter a certain age. Such a claim required them to show that
the practice of formal education after the eighth grade
would substantially and systemically interfere with the re
ligious development of their children. It was on that point
that they had made a “convincing showing” that others
might struggle to make. But that says nothing at all about
whether other parents could make the same convincing
showing with respect to more specific educational require
ments. Yoder is an important precedent of this Court, and
it cannot be breezily dismissed as a special exception
granted to one particular religious minority.
It instead embodies a principle of general applicability,
and that principle provides more robust protection for reli
gious liberty than the alarmingly narrow rule that the dis
sent propounds. The dissent sees the Free Exercise
Clause’s guarantee as nothing more than protection against
compulsion or coercion to renounce or abandon one’s reli
gion. See post, at 10 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (“the
Clause prohibits the government from compelling individu
als, whether directly or indirectly, to give up or violate their
religious beliefs”); ibid. (the “Free Exercise Clause forbids
affirmatively compelling individuals to perform acts unde
niably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
beliefs” (internal quotation marks and alterations omit
ted)); ibid. (the “Free Exercise Clause prohibits laws that
have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary
to their religious beliefs” (internal quotation marks omit
ted)). Under this test, even instruction that denigrates or
ridicules students’ religious beliefs would apparently be al
lowed.9
——————
9 In a footnote, the dissent retreats and suggests that denigration and
ridicule could amount to prohibited “coercion.” See post, at 12, n. 6 (opin
ion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). But this concession is either meaningless or un
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
31
We reject this chilling vision of the power of the state to
strip away the critical right of parents to guide the religious
development of their children. Yoder and Barnette embody
a very different view of religious liberty, one that comports
with the fundamental values of the American people.
d
We also disagree with the Fourth Circuit’s view that the
record before us is too “threadbare” to demonstrate a bur
den on religious exercise. 102 F. 4th, at 209. That court
faulted the parents for failing to make specific allegations
describing how the books “are actually being used in class
rooms.” Id., at 213. But when a deprivation of First
Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff need not wait for
the damage to occur before filing suit. Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (citing Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 (1974)). Instead, to pursue a
pre-enforcement challenge, a plaintiff must show that “the
threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a sub
stantial risk that the harm will occur.” 573 U. S., at 158
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the parents have
undoubtedly made that showing. The Board does not dis
pute that it is introducing the storybooks into classrooms,
that it is requiring teachers to use them as part of instruc
tion, and that it has encouraged teachers to approach class
room discussions in a certain way. See, e.g., Brief for Re
spondents 9–10. We do not need to “wait and see” how a
——————
dermines the dissent’s entire argument. The primary definition of “coer
cion” is little different from compulsion. See Webster’s Third New Inter
national Dictionary 439 (1971) (“use of physical or moral force to compel
to act or assent”); Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 398
(2d ed. 2001) (“use of force or intimidation to obtain compliance”). If that
is what the dissent means by “coercion,” then it is unclear why ridicule
or denigration would qualify as coercion under its test. By contrast, if
the dissent defines “coercion” to require less, then it has failed to explain
why our understanding of what the Clause protects is flawed.
32
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
particular book is used in a particular classroom on a par
ticular day before evaluating the parents’ First Amendment
claims. We need only decide whether—if teachers act ac
cording to the clear and undisputed instructions of the
Board—a burden on religious exercise will occur.
Besides, it is not clear how the Fourth Circuit expects the
parents to obtain specific information about how a particu
lar book was used or is planned for use at a particular time.
The Board has stated that it will not notify parents when
the books are being read. And it is not realistic to expect
parents to rely on after-the-fact reports by their young chil
dren to determine whether the parents’ free exercise rights
have been burdened. In circumstances like these, where
the Board has clearly stated how it intends to proceed, the
parents may base their First Amendment claim on the
Board’s representations.
e
Finally, we reject the alternatives offered to parents by
those who would defend the judgment below. The first of
those proposed alternatives is the suggestion that any par
ents who are unhappy about the instruction in question can
simply “place their children in private school or . . . educate
them at home.” Brief for Religious and Civil-Rights Organ
izations as Amici Curiae 14; accord, Brief for National Ed
ucation Association et al. as Amici Curiae 15; Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 10;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62. The availability of this option is no
answer to the parents’ First Amendment objections. As we
have previously held, when the government chooses to pro
vide public benefits, it may not “condition the availability of
[those] benefits upon a recipient’s willingness to surrender
his religiously impelled status.” Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 462 (2017) (inter
nal quotations marks and alterations omitted). That is
what the Board has done here. Public education is a public
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
33
benefit, and the government cannot “condition” its “availa
bility” on parents’ willingness to accept a burden on their
religious exercise. Ibid. Moreover, since education is com
pulsory in Maryland, see Md. Educ. Code Ann. §7–301(a
1)(1), the parents are not being asked simply to forgo a pub
lic benefit. They have an obligation—enforceable by fine or
imprisonment—to send their children to public school un
less they find an adequate substitute. §§7–301(a)(3), (e).10
And many parents cannot afford such a substitute.
The provision of education is an expensive endeavor. In
Montgomery County, as in many other jurisdictions, public
education is the most significant expenditure in the county
budget by a wide margin.11 In the 2025–2026 school year,
the county expects to spend $3.6 billion on public schools,
amounting to roughly $22,644 per student. See M. Elrich,
County Executive, FY26 Recommended Operating Budget
and FY26–FY31 Public Services Program, pp. 16 (mes
sage), 10–11 (Mar. 2025). To help finance that budget,
Montgomery County will levy property taxes and income
taxes on all residents, regardless of whether they send their
——————
10In light of this obligation, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972),
cannot be distinguished, as the dissent claims, see post, at 14–15 (opinion
of SOTOMAYOR, J.), on the ground that it involved compulsory school at
tendance. Here, the parents are being “affirmatively compel[led]” to do
the same thing as the parents in Yoder: submit their children to instruc
tion that would “substantially interfer[e] with the[ir] religious develop
ment.” 406 U. S., at 218. The dissent claims that the parents in Yoder,
unlike petitioners, “were prohibited by the challenged law from engaging
in religious teaching at home,” post, at 15, n. 6, but that is plainly untrue.
All that the Wisconsin law required was that the children attend school
until they reached the age of 16. Yoder, 406 U. S., at 207. The State
made no effort to prevent religious training when students were not in
school.
11In fiscal year 2026, the county expects to spend 47.3% of its budget on
public schools. See Montgomery County MD, Operating Budget by the
Numbers (2025), https://apps.montgomerycountymd.gov/BASISOPERATING
/Common/Index.aspx. By comparison, the next greatest expenditure
(public safety) is expected to account for just 10.6% of the budget. Ibid.
34
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
children to a public school. Id., at 5–10 to 5–11. Private
elementary schools in Montgomery County are expensive;
many cost $10,000 or more per year prior to financial aid.12
And homeschooling comes with a hefty price as well; it re
quires at least one parent to stay at home during the nor
mal workday to educate children, thereby forgoing addi
tional income opportunities. It is both insulting and legally
unsound to tell parents that they must abstain from public
education in order to raise their children in their religious
faiths, when alternatives can be prohibitively expensive
and they already contribute to financing the public schools.
Although the dissent does not follow suit in proposing
that the objecting parents send their children to private
school, it offers two other alternatives that are no better.
First, it suggests that the parents in this case have no legit
imate cause for concern because enforcement of the Board’s
policy would not prevent them from “teach[ing] their reli
gious beliefs and practices to their children at home.” Post,
at 15, n. 6 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). This suggestion com
plements the dissent’s narrow view of the right of parents
to raise their children in accordance with their faith. Ac
cording to the dissent, parents who send their children to
public school must endure any instruction that falls short
of direct compulsion or coercion and must try to counteract
that teaching at home. The Free Exercise Clause is not so
feeble. The parents in Barnette and Yoder were similarly
capable of teaching their religious values “at home,” but
that made no difference to the First Amendment analysis
in those cases.
Mustering one last alternative, the dissent asserts that,
——————
12See, e.g., Melvin J. Berman Hebrew Academy, Tuition and Financial
Aid, https://www.bermanhebrewacademy.org/admissions/financial-aid;
St. Bartholomew Catholic School, Tuition, https://www.school.
stbartholomew.org/tuition-and-support; St. Bernadette Catholic School,
2025–2026 Tuition, https://saintbernadetteschool.org/tuition; Alim Acad
emy, Tuition 2025–2026, https://alimacademy.org/tuition-2025-2026/.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
35
under its approach, the parents would “remain free to raise
objections to specific material through the” democratic pro
cess. Post, at 28. In making this argument, the dissent
seems to confuse our country with those in which laws en
acted by a parliament or another legislative body cannot be
challenged in court. In this country, that is not so. Here,
the Bill of Rights and the doctrine of judicial review protect
individuals who cannot obtain legislative change. The First
Amendment protects the parents’ religious liberty, and they
had every right to file suit to protect that right.13
B
For these reasons, we conclude that the Board’s introduc
tion of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, combined with
its no-opt-out policy, burdens the parents’ right to the free
exercise of religion. We now turn to the question whether
that burden is constitutionally permitted.
1
Under our precedents, the government is generally free
to place incidental burdens on religious exercise so long as
it does so pursuant to a neutral policy that is generally ap
plicable. Smith, 494 U. S., at 878–879. Thus, in most cir
cumstances, two questions remain after a burden on reli
gious exercise is found. First, a court must ask if the
burdensome policy is neutral and generally applicable. Sec
ond, if the first question can be answered in the negative, a
court will proceed to ask whether the policy can survive
strict scrutiny. Under that standard, the government must
demonstrate that “its course was justified by a compelling
state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that
interest.” Kennedy, 597 U. S., at 525.
——————
13In any event, the dissent’s argument ignores the extensive efforts
already made by parents in Montgomery County. Indeed, hundreds of
parents beseeched the Board to allow opt outs, but those pleas fell largely
on deaf ears. Supra, at 8–10.
36
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
Here, the character of the burden requires us to proceed
differently. When the burden imposed is of the same char
acter as that imposed in Yoder, we need not ask whether
the law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before
proceeding to strict scrutiny. That much is clear from our
decisions in Yoder and Smith.
In Yoder, the Court rejected the contention that the case
could be “disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin’s re
quirement . . . applies uniformly to all citizens of the State
and does not, on its face, discriminate against religions or a
particular religion.” 406 U. S., at 220. Instead, the Court
bypassed those issues and proceeded to subject the law to
close judicial scrutiny, asking whether the State’s interest
“in its system of compulsory education [was] so compelling
that even the established religious practices of the Amish
must give way.” Id., at 221.
Then, in Smith, we recognized Yoder as an exception to
the general rule that governments may burden religious ex
ercise pursuant to neutral and generally applicable laws.
Specifically, we described Yoder as a case “in which we have
held that the First Amendment bars application of a neu
tral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated ac
tion.” Smith, 494 U. S., at 881. And we explained that the
general rule did not apply in Yoder because of the special
character of the burden in that case. 494 U. S., at 881.
Thus, when a law imposes a burden of the same character
as that in Yoder, strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of
whether the law is neutral or generally applicable.14
——————
14In Smith, the Court speculated that the general rule was not applied
in Yoder because it “involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protec
tions.” 494 U. S., at 881. We need not consider whether the case before
us qualifies as such a “hybrid rights” case. Contra, post, at 35
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). Rather, it is sufficient to note that the bur
den imposed here is of the exact same character as that in Yoder. That
is enough to conclude that here, as in Yoder, strict scrutiny is appropriate
regardless of whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable.
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
37
As we have explained, the burden in this case is of the
exact same character as the burden in Yoder. The Board’s
policies, like the compulsory-attendance requirement in
Yoder, “substantially interfer[e] with the religious develop
ment” of the parents’ children. 406 U. S., at 218. And those
policies pose “a very real threat of undermining” the reli
gious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill
in their children. Ibid. We therefore proceed to consider
whether the policies can survive strict scrutiny.
2
To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demon
strate that its policy “advances ‘interests of the highest or
der’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.”
Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541 (2021) (quoting
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S.
520, 546 (1993)). In its filings before us, the Board asserts
that its curriculum and no-opt-out policy serve its compel
ling interest in “maintaining a school environment that is
safe and conducive to learning for all students.” Brief for
Respondents 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). It re
lies on the statements of an MCPS official who testified that
permitting opt outs would result in “significant disruptions
to the classroom environment” and would expose certain
students to “social stigma and isolation.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 607a–608a.
We do not doubt that, as a general matter, schools have a
“compelling interest in having an undisrupted school ses
sion conducive to the students’ learning.” Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 119 (1972). But the Board’s con
duct undermines its assertion that its no-opt-out policy is
necessary to serve that interest. As we have noted, the
——————
We acknowledge the many arguments pressed by the parents that the
Board’s policies are not neutral and generally applicable. See Brief for
Petitioners 35–44. But we need not consider those arguments further
given that strict scrutiny is appropriate under Yoder.
38
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
Board continues to permit opt outs in a variety of other cir
cumstances, including for “noncurricular” activities and the
“Family Life and Human Sexuality” unit of instruction, for
which opt outs are required under Maryland law. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 672a; Brief for Respondents 10–11 (citing
Code of Md. Regs., tit. 13a, §04.18.01(D)(2)). And the Board
goes to great lengths to provide independent, parallel pro
gramming for many other students, such as those who qual
ify as emergent multilingual learners (EMLs) or who qual
ify for an individualized educational program.15
This robust “system of exceptions” undermines the
Board’s contention that the provision of opt outs to religious
parents would be infeasible or unworkable. Fulton, 593
U. S., at 542.
The Board’s attempt to distinguish the other programs
for which it provides opt outs is unconvincing. The Board
asserts that the “Family Life and Human Sexuality” unit of
instruction is meaningfully different because it is “discrete”
and “predictably timed,” and therefore schools can accom
modate opt outs without producing the same “absenteeism
and administrability concerns.” Brief for Respondents 46.
But this assertion only tends to show that the Board’s con
——————
15As of September 30, 2023, 24.6% of Montgomery County elemen
tary school students qualified as EMLs. See MCPS, School Profiles,
MCPS Elementary Summary Dashboard, at Slide 1, https://www.
montgomeryschoolsmd.org/school-profiles/. Many MCPS schools provide
EML students with independent parallel programming pursuant to a
“[p]ullout” model, “in which . . . teachers work with EML students out
side of regular content classrooms.” M. McKnight, MCPS Superinten
dent, English Language Development Program Evaluation Report, pt. 2,
pp. 2–4 to 2–5 (Dec. 15, 2022) (prepared by Center for Applied Linguis
tics). In the 2022–2023 school year, “approximately one out of every
eight students” in MCPS schools received “special education services”
pursuant to an “ ‘Individualized Educational Program.’ ” Brief for 66
Members of Congress as Amici Curiae 18–19 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
39
cerns about “administrability” are a product of its own de
sign. If the Board can structure the “Family Life and Hu
man Sexuality” curriculum to more easily accommodate opt
outs, it could structure instruction concerning the
“LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks similarly. The Board can
not escape its obligation to honor parents’ free exercise
rights by deliberately designing its curriculum to make pa
rental opt outs more cumbersome.
The Board also suggests that permitting opt outs from
the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks would be especially un
workable because, when it permitted such opt outs in the
past, they resulted in “unsustainably high numbers of ab
sent students.” Id., at 12. But again, the Board’s concern
is self-inflicted. The Board is doubtless aware of the pres
ence in Montgomery County of substantial religious com
munities whose members hold traditional views on mar
riage, sex, and gender. When it comes to instruction that
would burden the religious exercise of parents, the Board
cannot escape its obligations under the Free Exercise
Clause by crafting a curriculum that is so burdensome that
a substantial number of parents elect to opt out. There is
no de maximis exception to the Free Exercise Clause.
Nor can the Board’s policies be justified by its asserted
interest in protecting students from “social stigma and iso
lation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 608a. In Maryland, the “Fam
ily Life and Human Sexuality” unit of instruction includes
discussions about sexuality and gender. See Maryland
State Dept. of Ed., Maryland Comprehensive Health Edu
cation Framework 33 (June 2021). Yet the Board has not
suggested that the legally-required provision of opt outs
from that curriculum has resulted in stigma or isolation.
Even if it did, the Board cannot purport to rescue one group
of students from stigma and isolation by stigmatizing and
isolating another. A classroom environment that is wel
coming to all students is something to be commended, but
such an environment cannot be achieved through hostility
40
MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR
Opinion of the Court
toward the religious beliefs of students and their parents.
We acknowledge that “courts are not school boards or leg
islatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’
of discrete aspects of a State’s program of compulsory edu
cation.” Yoder, 406 U. S., at 235. It must be emphasized
that what the parents seek here is not the right to mi
cromanage the public school curriculum, but rather to have
their children opt out of a particular educational require
ment that burdens their well-established right “to direct
‘the religious upbringing’ of their children.” Espinoza, 591
U. S., at 486 (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214). We
express no view on the educational value of the Board’s pro
posed curriculum, other than to state that it places an un
constitutional burden on the parents’ religious exercise if it
is imposed with no opportunity for opt outs. Providing such
an opportunity would give the parents no substantive con
trol over the curriculum itself.
Several States across the country permit broad opt outs
from discrete aspects of the public school curriculum with
out widespread consequences. See, e.g., 22 Pa. Code
§4.4(d)(3) (2025); Minn. Stat. §120B.20 (2024); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§15–102(A)(4), (8)(c) (2024). And prior to the
introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, the
Board’s own “Guidelines for Respecting Religious Diver
sity” gave parents a broad right to have their children ex
cused from specific aspects of the school curriculum. These
facts belie any suggestion that the provision of parental opt
outs in circumstances like these “will impose impossible ad
ministrative burdens on schools.” Post, at 24 (SOTOMAYOR,
J., dissenting).
IV
The Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” sto
rybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, places
an unconstitutional burden on the parents’ rights to the
free exercise of their religion. The parents have therefore
Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
41
shown that they are likely to succeed in their free exercise
claims. They have likewise shown entitlement to a prelim
inary injunction pending the completion of this lawsuit. In
the absence of an injunction, the parents will continue to be
put to a choice: either risk their child’s exposure to burden
some instruction, or pay substantial sums for alternative
educational services. As we have explained, that choice un
constitutionally burdens the parents’ religious exercise,
and “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even min
imal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irrepara
ble injury.’” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
592 U. S. 14, 19 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Fur
thermore, in light of the strong showing made by the par
ents here, and the lack of a compelling interest supporting
the Board’s policies, an injunction is both equitable and in
the public interest. The petitioners should receive prelimi
nary relief while this lawsuit proceeds. See Winter, 555
U. S., at 20. Specifically, until all appellate review in this
case is completed, the Board should be ordered to notify
them in advance whenever one of the books in question or
any other similar book is to be used in any way and to allow
them to have their children excused from that instruction.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Thank you for reading Von’s Substack. I would love it if you commented! I love hearing from readers, especially critical comments. I would love to start more letter exchanges, so if there’s a subject you’re interested in, get writing and tag me!Thank you for reading Von’s Substack. I would love it if you commented! I love hearing from readers, especially critical comments. I would love to start more letter exchanges, so if there’s a subject you’re interested in, get writing and tag me!
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Von
“MCPS is committed to making reasonable
accommodations” for the religious “beliefs and practices” of its students.
MCPS, Religious Diversity Guidelines in Montgomery County Public
Schools 1 (2024–2025).
For some reason, I don't believe you.
Language Arts] curriculum were not representative of
many students and families in Montgomery County be
cause they did not include LGBTQ characters.” Id., at 603a.
The Board therefore decided to introduce into the curricu
lum what it described as “‘LGBTQ+-inclusive texts.’”5 Id.,
Of course they did. Can't leave well enough alone.
How about stop pushing sexual deviance on children.
After reading this, the school district in question is constantly violating the first amendment by teaching the LGBT+ religion in public schools, and it is my opinion that every member of that school board is a pedophile.